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Social scientists of democratic change have emphasized the role of class action in that process, neglecting the dis-
cursive shift that was necessary to legitimate mass party competition in the early American case. Although histor-
ians of U.S. party formation have emphasized the discursive dimension of this transition, they have focused on
more formal theories of party and neglected the importance of martial discourse, which was perhaps more ped-
estrian, but had a distinctive mass appeal. Drawing on the papers of prominent politicians and the editorials
of local party newspapers in Alabama and Illinois, I argue that incipient party elites used the language of
wartime discipline to recruit national-level leaders, local operatives, and voters to the new form of elective politics.
Martial discourse was therefore integral to the larger discourse of party, which ultimately helped to overcome the
inherited antipartyism of the early Republic.
This paper centers on a paradox of early American
democratization, namely that as mass party compe-
tition got under way, political elites1 mixed party prac-
tices with antiparty rhetoric. In one sense, the
intolerance of partisanship is not at all surprising.
As Barry Schwartz observes, early America “stressed
the republican virtues of obligation, sacrifice, and dis-
interestedness” and accordingly reserved the terms
“party” and “faction” for any unpatriotic group that
placed private interests ahead of the public good.
For example, because “revolutionary republicans
took political economy, citizenship and faction to be
inextricably bound together,” among the more
hated parties were elusive “aristocrats” who schemed
to monopolize the Republic’s wealth, rather than
“promote widespread landownership as the foun-
dation of republican citizenship.”2
However, the pervasiveness of antipartyism bears
further analysis because the practitioners of antiparty
rhetoric were also prominent party leaders like
Martin Van Buren and his compatriots in New York
state’s “Albany Regency,” the nucleus of the incipient
Democratic organization. The puzzle that guides this
paper, therefore, is the following: how could mass
party competition originate in the interplay of partisan-
ship on the one hand and antipartyism on the other?
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1. I use the term “elite” to refer to politicians. I use the term
“class” to refer to economic groups. Post-revolutionary politicians
were not the landed and urban elite often referred to in the demo-
cratization literature. A key feature of post-revolutionary politics was
the election to state legislatures of men of moderate wealth who
replaced the wealthy few as the dominant force in American poli-
tics. See Jackson Turner Main, “Government by the People: The
American Revolution and the Democratization of the Legislatures,”
William and Mary Quarterly 23 (1966): 404–406 and Gordon S.
Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York:
Vintage, 1992), 87.
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Drawing on the papers of national elites and on
early nineteenth century Alabama and Illinois party
newspapers, I argue that this rhetorical mix was an
important part of a larger discursive shift that over-
came the inherited antipartyism of the early Republic
and thus eased the transition to mass party compe-
tition. The first party system (1789–1827), like the
second (1828–1860), was rife with interelite conflict,
but the former was different in at least two respects.
The political elites of the first party system did not
see themselves as “parties” but as loose coalitions
and used the terms “party” and “faction” to stigmatize
their political adversaries. Second, and as a result, the
first party system lacked an effective institutional
mechanism for managing dissent peacefully. The con-
stitutional phase of democratization had introduced a
contradiction into the heart of American government
by, on the one hand, furnishing political elites with
new resources with which to compete (voters), and
on the other hand, opening up elites to public chal-
lenge and thus to reoccurring crises of legitimacy.3
In order to discipline and capitalize on the expanding
franchise without resorting to state violence, political
elites had to simultaneously develop institutional
structures of party command that could mobilize
large numbers of people and also legitimate the exist-
ence of an organizational form (parties), which had
previously been seen as illegitimate.
The elites of the second party system, I argue, met
these demands in part by framing the political
struggles of the day as high stakes matters akin to
the revolution.4 Because the revolution was imagined
simultaneously as a conflict between British and
patriot forces as well as a triumph of patriotic solidar-
ity, the politicians of the second party system deployed
partisan (that is, oppositional) and antipartyist (that
is, unifying) themes in political contests. The rhetori-
cal invocation of wartime discipline elevated political
parties to the status of the revolutionary militia itself,
and consequently, the term, party, came to denote a
defense against, rather than a source of, corrupt self-
interest. The military form therefore did what other
arguments for party discipline could not do.
Unlike other partyist discursive currents, which
were more formal and legalistic in character, martial
discourse had mass appeal. It could connect national
elites with local operatives and voters on the ground
by offering a new generation of Americans a chance
to become soldiers in a revolution that they were
simply too young to fight. That is, if the partyist
theory of Van Buren and others provided the intellec-
tual rationale for the mass party system, then martial
discourse provided its emotional content and thus
worked to “recruit” Americans at all levels to partici-
pate in a new form of elective politics. In doing so,
martial discourse also helped to preclude reoccurring
crises of elite legitimacy for a generation.
By addressing the problem of early American
democratization in this way, this paper contributes
to both the social science and historiographical litera-
tures on the subject. Historians have long known and
written about the party-antiparty paradox, but social
scientists have yet to incorporate its implications for
the study of democratization.5 Most of this literature
suggests that democratic change originates in the
presence and relative strength of competing class
actors. In contrast, I argue that at least one critical
phase of democratization—the advent of mass party
competition—is facilitated by the manipulation and
deployment of discourses by political elites. In
addition, although historians have documented the
discursive dimensions of this transition, they have
largely focused on the formal theories of party. In
this paper, I combine the otherwise isolated litera-
tures on martial discourse and antipartyism to offer
a new synthesis, namely that while rational argument
undoubtedly worked to overcome antipartyism,
martial discourse played a complementary role in
this transition by furnishing a language of mobiliz-
ation that could recruit diverse sets of actors to the
practice of mass party politics.
POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRATIZATION
E. E. Schattschneider once argued, “Political parties
created democracy . . . modern democracy is unthink-
able save in terms of the parties.” Indeed, it was the
centrality of party competition to democracy that ani-
mated V. O. Key’s classic critique of the Solid South’s
one-party system. “The best government,” he wrote,
3. By 1825, prior to the advent of the mass party system, “every
state but Rhode Island, Virginia, and Louisiana had achieved uni-
versal manhood suffrage.” Wood, Radicalism of the American Revolu-
tion, 294. For a comprehensive account of the broadening
franchise in this period, see Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote:
The Contested History of Democracy in the United States (New York:
Basic Books, 2000).
4. By discourse, I mean a species of talk whose logic legitimates
some practices and disqualifies others within a given polity.
5. The key texts on the party-antiparty paradox include Lynn L.
Marshall, “The Strange Stillbirth of the Whig Party” American His-
torical Review 72 (1967): 445–468; Michael Wallace, “Changing Con-
cepts of Party in the United States: New York, 1815–1828,” American
Historical Review 74 (1968): 453–491; Richard Hofstadter, The Idea of
a Party System: The Rise of Legitimate Opposition in the United States,
1780–1840 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1969); Major Wilson, “Republicanism and the Idea of Party
in the Jacksonian Period,” Journal of the Early Republic 8: 419–442;
Kruman, “The Second American Party System”; David Waldstrei-
cher, In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American National-
ism, 1776–1820 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1997); Ronald P. Formisano, “The ‘Party Period’ Revisited,”
Journal of American History 86 (1999): 93–120; Mark Voss-Hubbard,
“The ‘Third Party Tradition’ Reconsidered: Third Parties and
American Public Life, 1830–1900,” Journal of American History 86
(1999): 121–150; Gerald Leonard, The Invention of Party Politics: Fed-
eralism, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Development in Jackso-
nian Illinois (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).
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“results when there is free and vigorous competition
at the ballot box in contests in which genuine issues
are defined and candidates take a stand.” Robert
Dahl, whose foundational work on polyarchy
remains a touchstone for defining what we mean
when we speak of formally existing democracy, simi-
larly defines polyarchies as “highly inclusive and
extensively open to public contestation.” That is, to
qualify as a polyarchy, it is insufficient to enfranchise
the mass public; a regime must allow legal opposition,
which, in most known cases of polyarchy, has taken
the form of a competitive mass party system.6
Despite the known links between political parties
and democracy, the key controversy in the literature
on democratic transitions and expansions has cen-
tered on which economic class—landowning, bour-
geois, peasant, or working—is the prime mover of
democratic change. In this, there are two orienting
poles: those who privilege the upper classes in that
process and those who privilege the lower classes.
The canonical example of the upper-class-driven
view is Barrington Moore’s claim that “a vigorous
and independent class of town dwellers has been an
indispensable element in the growth of parliamentary
democracy. No bourgeois, no democracy.”7 In con-
trast, Rueschemeyer et al. find that when landed
classes and the bourgeoisie “felt acutely threatened
in their vital interests by popular pressures, they
invariably opposed democracy,” leading them to
suggest that in fact “the working class was the most
consistently pro-democratic force.”8 The upper-/
lower-class divide, in turn, has given rise to attempts
at synthesis. Collier, for example, offers “an insti-
tutional and path-dependent explanation” in which
labor’s participation in democratization varies with
“the context of prior experience with democratic
regimes and the type of antecedent regime.” Accord-
ingly, Collier finds several patterns of democratization,
some of which are upper-class-driven, others working-
class-driven, and still others “joint projects.”9
This overarching class emphasis has led scholars of
democratization, first, to cut across otherwise robust
theoretical insights on parties too quickly; second,
to settle on an approach to parties that defines their
role too narrowly; and third, to assume the legitimacy
of parties prematurely. Rueschemeyer and the Ste-
phenses, for example, view party elites as middlemen
who regulate the perceived threat posed by the
working class to the dominant classes in transitions
to democracy. “Political parties,” they find,
“emerged in the crucial role as mediators,” tempering
the radicalism of the lower classes so as to keep the
bourgeoisie from pursuing authoritarian alternatives.
Although the “party-as-mediator” approach uncovers
some of what party elites do in democratic transition,
Rueschemeyer et al. actually offer a potentially
broader conceptualization of party practices late in
their conclusion, one that treats politics “as a distinct
analytical dimension of civil society which is strongly
affected by but cannot be reduced to the economic
and class structure.”10
Rather than make “an attempt . . . to explain the
origins of party systems,” however, they then quickly
cede their ground to exactly the opposite theory of
Lipset and Rokkan, in which parties are relegated to
the role of expressing the demands of cleavage
groups.11 The American case involves some
mediation to the degree that effective disciplinary
rhetoric may well have kept certain sectors of society
from abandoning the democratic project in favor of
more repressive alternatives. Nevertheless, this
arrangement does not emerge in the context of
mediation between an upper and a lower class but
in a struggle between two factions of the second gen-
eration political elite. Nor is the language of this
struggle one of mediation but of violent insurrection,
channeled into the ritual of mass party competition.
Finally, the party-as-mediator framework unduly
assumes a) the legitimacy of parties as an organiz-
ational form and b) the authority of parties to
mediate on behalf of competing class actors. In
sum, Rueschemeyer et al., like other scholars of
democratization, conceive of party elites in ways that
6. E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1942), 1; V. O. Key, Southern Politics
(New York: Vintage, 1949), x; Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation
and Opposition (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
1971), 8. For others who employ Dahl’s assumptions, see, for
instance, Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Tran-
sitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain
Democracies (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1986), 74n2 and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Ste-
phens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy
(Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1992), 10, 314n5.
7. Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democ-
racy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1966), 418. For other elite-driven approaches, see
also O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule;
Terry Lynn Karl, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin
America,” Comparative Politics 23 (1990): 1–21; and John Peeler,
Building Democracy in Latin America (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1998).
8. Rueschemeyer et al., Capitalist Development and Democracy, 8.
For another non-elite-driven approach, see also Go¨ran Therborn,
“The Travail of Latin American Democracy,” New Left Review 113–
114 (1979): 80, 85.
9. Ruth Berins Collier, Paths toward Democracy: the Working Class
and Elites in Western Europe and South America (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1999). For other synthetic approaches, see also
Peter Winn, Weavers of Revolution: The Yarur Workers and Chile’s
Road to Socialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) and
Jeffery M. Paige, Coffee and Power: Revolution and the Rise of Democracy
in Central America (Cambridge and London: Harvard University
Press, 1997).
10. Rueschemeyer et al., Capitalist Development and Democracy, 9,
287.
11. Rueschemeyer et al., Capitalist Development and Democracy,
288; Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, Party Systems and
Voter Alignments: Cross-national Perspectives (New York: Free Press,
1967).
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exclude the cultural dimensions of political practice
and thereby fall short of explaining how mass party
politics become legitimate in the first place.
Like Rueschemeyer et al., others in the field have
made important observations about the discursive
dynamics of democratic transition only to retreat to
more familiar ground. Paige, for example, explains
Central America’s recent transition to neoliberal
democracy in terms of the convergence of liberal
and socialist discourses but then concludes by giving
most of the credit to a “socialist revolution from
below.” Similarly, O’Donnell and Schmitter make
the provocative claim that “the key to the party’s effi-
cacy . . . lies in its capacity to generate symbols of
partial political identity . . . which bring together
voters and militants across many of the lines which
otherwise divide them.” However, in a return to the
rational choice basis of their “elite bargaining”
approach, the two ultimately confine the role of
party elites to a single moment in democratic tran-
sition, the “founding election,” in which a “cartel of
party elites” are said to forge “pacts” that “(1) limit
the agenda of policy choice, (2) share proportion-
ately in the distribution of benefits, and (3) restrict
the participation of outsiders in decision-making.”12
Inattention to political discourse also renders
the social science literature on party formation
ill-equipped to explain how second party system
elites overcame the inherited antipartyism of the
early national electorate. John Aldrich holds that
American political parties emerged first as legislative
coalitions, and then as mass parties, to solve successive
collective action problems. Thus, “primarily
parties-in-government” surfaced when legislators dis-
covered that their preferences could be realized
more efficiently when they aligned themselves with
likeminded colleagues. “A series of problems that
necessarily arise in elections and in governance,” he
writes, “make it possible for politicians to win more
of what they seek to win, more often, and over a
longer period by creating political parties.” Incipient
Democratic Party elites like Martin Van Buren then
confronted the free rider problems associated with
organizing largely autonomous state elites and a
far-flung mass electorate by building the National
Alliance and Caucus, which worked in tandem to
reduce the costs and maximize the perceived benefits
and intrinsic value of mass party affiliation.13
Another elite-driven approach argues that patron-
age systems are the prime mover of mass party for-
mation. According to Shefter (1994) elites use
parties as vehicles to mobilize mass constituencies
either to take, or to secure their hold, over the
government. At the core of the mass party system,
then, is the mechanism of calculated mutual benefit:
parties distribute “divisible benefits” to individuals for
their political support or collective benefits “to elicit
contributions of money, labor, or votes.”14
In contrast, Lipset and Rokkan’s view of party for-
mation holds that parties “have an expressive func-
tion” and “develop a rhetoric for the translation of
contrasts in the social and cultural structure into
demands for action.” Parties reflect the true motor
of politics, social differentiation ( for example, along
class or religious lines), in the legislative sphere.
Moreover, cleavages are said to originate in far off
“critical junctures” like the Protestant Reformation
and Industrial Revolution, such that most political
elites often have no temporal access to the historic
rifts that supposedly divide their communities.15
The shortcomings of these approaches to party
formation mirror those of the democratization litera-
ture. First, they assume away the cultural impediments
to party formation. For Aldrich, the key challenges to
mass party formation were the collective action pro-
blems inherent to the organization of rational
actors, not the discursive legitimation of political
parties as an organizational form. Shefter’s approach
presupposes that party patronage will be seen as a
legitimate practice, presumably because individuals
and groups stand to benefit from its enactment.
Lipset and Rokkan assume that critical junctures
beget new social cleavages and that new social clea-
vages naturally beget new parties, which represent
those competing interests. None of these approaches
contemplates a political culture within which parties
are so stigmatized that elites would first have to rein-
vent parties in order to inaugurate mass party compe-
tition. Second, the agency of political elites is
theorized too narrowly. Lipset and Rokkan in particu-
lar only allow politicians to translate ancient social
divides into demands for action. Aldrich is better on
this score, but for him, and indeed for Shefter, elite
agency amounts to rational calculation. There is
potential for something more in Aldrich’s account
of the transition from legislative to mass parties
because he views the intrinsic value of voting
(“citizen duty” or “being known to be on the right
side”) as part of the calculus of the early mass
12. Paige, Coffee and Power; O’Donnell and Schmitter, Tran-
sitions from Authoritarian Rule, 40–41, 57–58.
13. John H. Aldrich, Why Parties?: the Origin and Transformation
of Political Parties in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1995), 28, 47–50, 97, 100–125.
14. Martin Shefter, Political Parties and the State: The American
Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994),
5, 21.
15. Lipset and Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Alignments, 5;
Stein Rokkan, State Formation, Nation-building, and Mass politics in
Europe: the Theory of Stein Rokkan (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999), 302–305. Duverger and the institutional school rep-
resent a fourth approach that focuses on the importance of elec-
toral rules in shaping the character of party systems. Maurice
Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the
Modern State (London: Methuen, 1954). However, institutionalists
are silent on the origins of parties per se. They are better at addres-
sing what kind of parties and how many parties.
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electorate. One might therefore plausibly frame
martial discourse as one among a complex of
factors that counter the costs of mass party affiliation.
However, Aldrich’s focus is not on the rhetoric driving
mass mobilization but the self-interest of elites, who
above all understood that “control of a majority in
the public brought control of office, and with that,
control of policy and the spoils of office.”16
Even if none of these criticisms held water, however,
most of these theories would suffer from the problem
of timing. The central controversy in the democratiza-
tion literature turns on which social class is the most
consistent bearer of democratic change, yet as
Jackson Turner Main demonstrated long ago, many
first and second party system elites were drawn from
similar social strata, a fact that gives us little purchase
in explaining the differences between the first and
second party systems. Lipset and Rokkan hold that
social cleavages give rise to new party systems, yet
the regional, ethnocultural, and socioeconomic clea-
vages that divided the first party system also operated
in the second. Finally, although the spoils system has
become synonymous with the Jackonian Democratic
Party, patronage was also part of the first party
system’s landscape, as in the case of John Adams’s
infamous “midnight appointments.” There is suffi-
cient doubt, therefore, that these approaches can
explain why the first party system suffered from reoc-
curring crises of elite legitimacy, whereas the second
party system did not. Elements of martial discourse
had existed in the first party system, but second gener-
ation elites would first have to distort and reconstitute
them before they could be of service in making the
practice of mass partisanship palatable to an other-
wise antiparty republic. Of the foregoing hypotheses,
then, only martial discourse has the promise of
explaining this transition in ways that others cannot
and that impart new perspective to our understand-
ing of party development and democratization in
the early United States.
THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF ANTIPARTYISM
AND MARTIAL DISCOURSE
Scholars of American political history have had a long
and extensive engagement with the party-antiparty
paradox, and unlike scholars of democratization in
the social sciences, they have focused their attention
squarely on the discursive shift that gave rise to the
mass party system. In that sense, historians are inno-
cent of the theoretical problems enumerated thus
far. Instead, the historiographical literature is
limited in two other ways. First, the particular
aspects of partyist discourse emphasized by the litera-
ture lack a mass appeal that could mobilize actors at
all levels of the body politic. Second, historians of
party have not engaged either with the evidence of
martial discourse in their own work or with the litera-
tures that make some effort to explain martial
discourse.
The historiography has focused largely on the
origins and subsequent evolution of party theory.
Hofstadter, for instance, traces the rise and fall of suc-
cessive schools of thought, from the more uncompro-
mising antipartyism of Bolingbroke and Hamilton, to
the Hume-Madison synthesis, which saw parties as an
inevitability that must be controlled by institutional
checks, and at last to Martin Van Buren and the
Albany Regency who “demanded not merely volun-
tary concurrence” among their colleagues as their
pro-party precursor, Edmund Burke, had thought suf-
ficient, “but thoroughgoing subordination.” Similarly,
Wilson held that the “defensive prerogative” of the
country to form a party in the face of a conspiracy
by the kingly court was originally Bolingbroke’s for-
mulation and later informed Van Buren’s theory of
party. Thus, Wilson wrote, “Van Buren took the
Bolingbroke rationale for temporary party activity by
the Country and turned it into an argument for per-
manent organization.” Most recently, Leonard has
explained the emergence of mass party politics in
terms of successive forms of constitutionalism. That
account begins with Madison’s “Constitution against
parties,” continues with the rise of Van Buren consti-
tutionalism, which justified party formation by insist-
ing “the proposed party was to be a party of the
whole sovereign democracy,” as opposed to “self-
interested minorities” or “aristocrats,” and ends with
the unexpected triumph of “the two-party
constitution.”17
The decisiveness of formal theories of party in over-
coming the inherited antipartyism of the early Repub-
lic is now hardly in doubt, but the more pedestrian
and perhaps less scholarly discourse of wartime disci-
pline seems to have escaped the attention of histor-
ians of party. This paper aims to fill that gap.
Martial discourse was no more important than the
theories that underpinned the emergence of mass
party politics, but it helped to frame partisanship in
ways that diverse sets of actors could understand
and accept, and it acted as a rhetorical device for
the recruitment of these actors into the new form of
elective politics. Martial discourse, in other words,
complemented the theoretical basis of party dis-
course. For example, the solidaristic and oppositional
strains of martial discourse meshed with the contrast
between the indivisible democracy and the minoritar-
ian aristocracy, which was at the core of what Leonard
calls the partyist constitution. Thus, while the Van
Burenite avant-garde in Illinois no doubt advanced
16. Aldrich, Why Parties?, 100–102.
17. Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party System, 16, 18–23, 24, 252;
Wilson, “Republicanism and the Idea of Party,” 433; Leonard, Inven-
tion of Party Politics, 9, 11, 17.
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their theories in straightforward constitutional terms
as Leonard convincingly shows, they also, I maintain,
simultaneously deployed martial discourse as if to
translate the party and antiparty pillars of Van
Buren constitutionalism into a language of mass
mobilization that could hail national elites, local oper-
atives, and rank-and-file voters to action.
This is not to suggest that martial discourse is terra
incognita. The historiography of early American poli-
tics is littered with martial quotations from antebel-
lum sources, but many historians appear unaware or
uninterested in the specifically martial content of
their evidence. For example, in one of the founda-
tional essays on mass party formation, Michael
Wallace quoted this passage from the National Advo-
cate: “We will surrender nothing voluntarily to our
opponents; let them fight and conquer, as the demo-
cratic party has done, and we will submit quietly.” The
passage is classically martial. The words, “surrender,”
“fight,” “conquer,” and “submit,” spring from the
page, but rather than explore the implications of
martial discourse for the partisan turn, Wallace—
like other historians of party—uses this quotation as
evidence of something else, namely the majoritarian
logic of Van Buren’s theory of party.18
A handful of historians have published on martial
discourse, though typically not in reference to early
mass party formation. Richard Jensen, for example,
documents the transition from an older “army style”
of political language to a new “merchandising style”
in the 1890s. Jean Baker has explored martial dis-
course as one among several important elements of
northern Democratic Party political culture and has
argued, in another context, that it was critical to the
survival of republican ideology during the rise of lib-
eralism. Finally, though Steven Watts also looks at the
role of actual war in forging a peculiarly American
brand of liberalism, he explores war as discourse,
for instance, in the way that early political elites
believed that war regenerated the polity. Among his-
torians in this area, Marc Kruman is perhaps the
only synthetic figure in that he uses “martial rhetoric”
to demonstrate that the second party system was
rooted in the ideology of revolutionary republican-
ism. Nevertheless, like other historians of party,
Kruman’s overall focus is the way in which revolution-
ary republicanism shaped the emerging theory
of party.19
The most important gap in Kruman’s treatment of
martial discourse, however, is the absence of the
dynamic tension between antipartyism and partyism
that Leonard captures in his account of Van Buren
constitutionalism. This paper fuses Kruman’s use of
martial rhetoric as revolutionary imagery with Leo-
nard’s unique interpretation of the party-antiparty
paradox. The resulting synthesis highlights the inter-
dependence of partisanship and antipartyism within
martial rhetoric and the importance of that interde-
pendence for overcoming antipartyism and stabiliz-
ing the political system. This account of martial
discourse, then, is not intended to supplant the
reigning interpretations of this period, thereby advan-
cing an alternative monocausal (and ultimately unsa-
tisfying) account of the transition in question, but is
offered instead as a neglected chapter to be inte-
grated into the existing historiography.
DATA, CASE SELECTION, AND METHOD
To show how my claims about martial discourse scale
up and down the different levels of party organiz-
ation, I have collected data on three sets of political
actors.20 First, I make use of the private papers of
the period’s most prominent national statesmen, the
complete collections of which are published in
bound volumes. The paper draws on the correspon-
dence of George Washington, Alexander Hamilton,
John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and
James Monroe for the first party system and draws
on that of John Quincy Adams, Andrew Jackson,
Martin Van Buren, and Henry Clay for the transition
to the second party system. Secondly, to document the
character of martial discourse among local elites, I
have collected qualitative archival data with special
attention to historical newspapers. Early nineteenth
century newspapers were the official organs of the
political parties. Saul Cornell’s work on Antifederalist
dissent suggests that newspapers were the principal
means through which the far-flung political elites of
the early Republic tied their parties together in a
common public sphere. Finally, with respect to
voters, Robertson notes, “The principal vehicle for
conveying the rhetoric and practice of mass partisan-
ship was a growing network of newspapers” through
which “the web of relationships between editors, cor-
respondents, and readers grew and thickened.” For
18. Wallace, “Changing Concepts of Party in the United
States,” 479.
19. Richard Jensen, The winning of the Midwest: social and political
conflict, 1888–1896 (Chicago and London: University of Chicago
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(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 287–291; Jean H. Baker,
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North,” American Quarterly 37 (1985): 545–549; Steven Watts, The
Republic Reborn: War and the Making of Liberal America, 1790–1820
(Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1987), 88–92; Kruman, “The Second American Party System,”
523–525.
20. I have done my best here to show how my claims about
martial discourse in Chicago and Tuscaloosa scale up to claims
about national party discipline. For instance, I have tried to bring
out the continuities in the use of the discourse by national elites,
local elites, and local voters, but the state and regional levels of
analysis are inevitably absent. My compromise position has been
to complement a broad national-level overview with a more fine-
grained analysis of discursive dynamics on the ground.
CEDRIC DE LEON126
that reason, I draw on the same newspapers for evi-
dence of positive audience reception of martial dis-
course. I focus in particular on the meetings of
local rank-and-file voters, the minutes of which were
often published in their respective party organs.21
This paper is part of a larger research project on
the advent of liberal democracy in the United
States. It continues similar work by the author on
Chicago party politics and democratization by offer-
ing a southern comparison case and by outlining
the pre-history of Barrington Moore’s “last capitalist
revolution.” Given the broad framework of which
this paper is a part, the immediate question arises,
“why examine local cases at all?” The answer in brief
is that national parties did not have a separate insti-
tutional identity from their state and local affiliates
as they do now. National parties were confederations
of state and local party machines.22 To be sure,
Washington and Jackson were not merely the heads
of state and local parties (indeed, that is why we
draw on their private papers here), but as a general
rule, to speak of nationally prominent elites in the
nineteenth century was to speak of the most powerful
state and local party chieftains.
But why Illinois and Alabama? First, any number of
states would have made promising cases, but Illinois
and Alabama are better suited than some. In South
Carolina, for instance, electoral competition revolved
around two factions of the same party, rather than a
two-party system as such. Moreover, Illinois and
Alabama joined the Republic at roughly the same his-
torical conjuncture (1818–1819), the eve of the Mis-
souri crisis and the Panic of 1819. Additionally, as
Formisano rightly notes in his study of the ethnocul-
tural basis of mass party formation in Michigan, the
politics of frontier states offer more insight into the
character of mass party discipline as it spread and
became a more generalized political practice than
older states like New York and Virginia where pro-
party elites were already concentrated.23 Lastly,
Illinois and Alabama were the political epicenters of
their sections leading up to the Civil War: Abraham
Lincoln and Stephen A. Douglas, the presidential
nominees of the national Republican and Democratic
Parties respectively, were both from Illinois, and
Alabama was home to the first capital of the Confed-
eracy and arguably its most outspoken proponent,
William L. Yancey.
The local cases of Chicago and Tuscaloosa, in turn,
were chosen for two reasons. First, in the early Repub-
lic the two towns were similarly positioned within
their states. Chicago was emerging as the center of
political power in northern Illinois and became an
important trading center when a harbor and canal
were built to connect downstate Illinois to New York
and Europe by way of the Erie Canal in the East. Simi-
larly, Tuscaloosa was Alabama’s capital until the
mid-1840s, and with its position at the head of the
Black Warrior River, it linked the yeoman economy
of northern Alabama to the plantation economy
and Gulf Coast commercial hub of Mobile to the
South. At the same time, Chicago and Tuscaloosa’s
differences provide an opportunity to observe how
mass party discipline operated in somewhat divergent
contexts, with the former being a mainly urban
Democratic stronghold and the latter being a more
rural Whig stronghold.
I employ two methodological techniques from
comparative and historical research to make claims
about the role of martial discourse in mass party com-
petition. First, I use counterfactual reasoning to show
not only that the presence of mass party discipline
blunted the challenges to elite legitimacy posed by
the competition for voters (the proverbial “just so”
story), but also that in the absence of mass party disci-
pline, challenges to elite legitimacy deepened to the
point of national crisis.24 In the first half of the
empirical section I describe what American politics
looked like without a such a mechanism, paying
special attention to two crises: the first culminating
in the presidential election of 1800 and the second
culminating in the economic panic and Missouri
crisis of 1819.
I borrow the second technique from two separate
literatures. Research on European class formation
has shown that eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
21. Saul Cornell, The Other Founders: Anti-Federalism and the Dis-
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workers judged the legitimacy of incipient capitalist
practices, not in terms of newer ideas like socialism,
but in terms of older, established discourses. Sewell,
for instance, held that the ideologies of French
workers through the revolutions of 1789, 1830, and
1848 originated, and subsequently evolved out of,
“the prerevolutionary corporate system.”25 Historio-
graphers of colonial North America have made
similar arguments about the staying power of pre-
existing cultural idioms, for example, in precipitating
the American Revolution.26
To give analytical weight to cultural mechanisms,
the above analysts often trace the historical pathways
through which inherited idioms become distorted
and then give rise to new practices. Richard White
uses this technique in theorizing the process of
accommodation between Europeans and Indians
prior to 1815. Each set of actors, White argues,
brought to their prolonged encounter preconceived
notions of the other, which clashed to produce fruit-
ful misunderstandings:
Diverse peoples adjust their differences
through what amounts to a process of creative
and often expedient, misunderstandings.
People try to persuade others who are different
from themselves by appealing to what they per-
ceive to be the values and practices of those
others. They often misinterpret and distort
both the values and the practices of those
they often deal with, but from these misunder-
standings arise new meanings and through
them new practices.27
Taking my cue from White and others, I devote a sub-
section below to the distortion of inherited discursive
practices, namely first-party system electioneering
rituals, the defensive prerogative of revolutionary
republicanism, and the concept of war as regenerative
of the polity. From there I am able to show that
martial discourse—an amalgamation of these dis-
torted practices—worked to stabilize the political
system by providing an idiom through which a) pre-
viously antiparty elites could embrace their turn to
party organization, b) local elites could find an
identity within the larger mass party apparatus, and
c) voters on the ground could actively participate in
elective politics.
This is not a “causal” argument in the conventional
sense of the term. To my knowledge, there are no
transcripts of meetings in which prominent antebel-
lum politicians explicitly proposed martial discourse
as a strategy for overcoming antipartyism. However,
the evidence does suggest that martial discourse
appeared in its partisan form in the second party
system, but not in the first; that its use was pervasive
in the second party system; that its partyist and anti-
party dimensions meshed with the emerging theory
of party; and that its effect was to legitimize mass
party competition and thus recruit others to the prac-
tice thereof.
The fourth kind of evidence bears further clarifica-
tion here, as it comprises the bulk of the data in the
second half of the empirical section below. The avail-
able data gesture toward what Althusser has referred
to in another context as “interpellation,” defined as
the process through which people come to recognize
themselves as subjects in ideological practice.28 Thus,
while the primary sources do not offer any “smoking
gun” or moments of conversion, they do reveal an
unfolding process in which national elites, local oper-
atives, and the rank-and-file came to recognize them-
selves as Democrats and Whigs. I argue that martial
rhetoric, because of the distinct way in which it articu-
lated the party-antiparty mix, was one element in the
overarching party discourse that enabled the process
of mass party identification.
One last prefatory remark. Although military refer-
ences to the American Revolution are plentiful in my
sample of primary materials, not all such rhetoric, in
my view, need mention Bunker Hill or George
Washington explicitly to qualify as a martial reference
to the revolution. Moreover, some martial references
recall the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812 at
the same time. The latter was particularly germane
to the second party system because of its partial indu-
cement of electoral reform and its establishment of
General Andrew Jackson as a national symbol.
Finally, such references were not purely militaristic
in character, but rather were used in combination
with other tropes to undermine the legitimacy of pol-
itical adversaries. For instance, class inequality figured
prominently in the Democratic deployment of
martial discourse, such that the tyrants standing in
for King George were bankers, speculators, and
their putative allies in the Whig Party. What is more
important than providing either explicit or purely
military references to the revolution is demonstrating
why martial discourse helped to overcome the
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language of labor from the old regime to 1848 (Cambridge and
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 2. See also Craig
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antipartyism of the early Republic and thus stabilize
political conflict.
FACTIOUS REVOLUTIONARIES: ANTIPARTYISM
AND THE CRISIS OF ELITE LEGITIMACY
In the absence of mass party discipline, political elites
failed repeatedly to resolve the contradiction posed
by the constitutional phase of American democratiza-
tion, namely that the Constitution furnished political
elites with a new resource—voters—with which to
compete, even as it opened elites to unprecedented
challenges to their legitimacy from both the electo-
rate and elite challengers. Equipped only with repub-
lican ideology and a constitution that was hostile to
political parties, post-revolutionary elites plunged
the nation into two successive crises of elite legiti-
macy: the election of 1800 in which nothing less
than the threat of civil war secured the accession of
Thomas Jefferson to the presidency, and a subsequent
period of one-party rule beginning in 1815 that factio-
nalized the Republic along economic and regional
lines and ended in a five-way race for the White
House, the abortive resolution of which left many
wondering whether the election of President John
Quincy Adams was in fact a fraud. Like the first, the
second crisis demonstrates the absence of any reliable
mechanism to resolve dissent peacefully and thereby
confer legitimacy upon governing elites.
I frame my account of the crisis of 1800 by dispen-
sing with the alternative hypothesis that the crisis was
fundamentally one of partisan succession. Whereas in
1796 the presidency had passed between two leaders
of the same party (Washington to Adams, both Feder-
alists), the literature suggests that in 1800 it was passed
for the first time from one party to another, that is,
from Adams to the Republican, Thomas Jefferson.29
In this half of the first empirical section, I argue
that the crisis at its core was neither one of succession
nor one that gave birth to a mature party system in
which competing elites accepted the principle of
the alternation of power.
Let us first take up the question of succession. The
conflict over succession merely amplified a prior
unwillingness on the part of competing post-
revolutionary elites to countenance dissent or
permit legal opposition. Early elites had assumed
that the institutional counterweights of the presi-
dency, Senate, and House would by themselves
resolve political conflict without recourse to parties,
but the source of conflict lay elsewhere.30 Reflecting
on Washington’s troubled administration, President
James Monroe hit closer to the mark:
It is believed that no person was ever called to a
trust of greater delicacy and difficulty than was
our first Chief Magistrate . . . His difficulties
arose from the nature of the trust itself: the
commencement of a new government with a
divided sovereignty respecting which, in some
of its powers, a greater diversity of sentiment
had prevailed and strong parties been formed
in the discussions which led to its adoption,
which still existed and might be felt in its sub-
sequent movement. No such government had
ever existed before because the sovereignty,
independent of other peculiarities, had never
been divided before, nor can it be divided
except where the sovereignty is in the people
and the government, a trust created by
compact, in which those who discharge its
duties have no rights or interests of their own,
but are mere agents employed for the
purpose.31
Sovereignty, in other words, had resided in the single
person of the monarch but was now divided between
the people and the government, giving rise to “a
greater diversity of sentiment” and “strong parties”
over the appropriate division of power between the
two. The ensuing struggle exposed a tension
between the new and the old, for as Goodman
writes, on the one hand, “the deferential style of poli-
tics lingering from the past assumed that a disinter-
ested, virtuous, and wise few were entrusted with
power,” but on the other hand, “party politics
assumed that no group had either a prescriptive
right to govern or an inherent monopoly of wisdom
or incompetence.”32
Though Washington’s initial instinct was to make
peace among the holders of these diverse sentiments
(most famously between Jefferson and Hamilton), he
eventually adopted a harder line against the opposi-
tion. In his “Farewell Address,” Washington character-
ized obedience to the government as the duty of a
free people:
The very idea of the power and the right of the
people to establish government presupposes
29. Susan Dunn, Jefferson’s Second Revolution: the Election Crisis of
1800 and the Triumph of Republicanism (New York: Houghton Mifflin,
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Bowling and Donald R. Kennon (Athens, OH: Ohio University
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(New York: Free Press, 2007), 270.
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the duty of every individual to obey the estab-
lished government. All obstructions to the
execution of the laws, all combinations and
associations, under whatever plausible charac-
ters, with the real design to direct, control,
counteract, or awe the regular deliberation
and action of the constituted authorities, are
destructive of this fundamental principle and
of fatal tendency.33
Washington’s wholesale rejection of “combinations
and associations” seeking to “counteract” the policies
of the Federalist legislative agenda gave rise to state
repression under his own administration and even-
tually set the stage for the Alien and Sedition Laws
of 1798 under John Adams. Indeed, the Federalists
came to rely increasingly on state repression to
manage elite and mass dissent. When farmers in
western Pennsylvania and neighboring Virginia and
Kentucky rebelled against an excise tax on distilled
liquor, Washington raised an army roughly the size
of the entire revolutionary militia to crush them,
albeit without much incident.34
Paradoxically, Washington then blamed the rebel-
lion on “democratic societies,” which were only
loosely affiliated with Republicans but were framed
by the Federalists as the heart and soul of the party.
Alarmed at the prospect of further state repression,
even Republicans denounced the societies for
handing the Federalists an excuse to smear them as
traitors. Jefferson was more sympathetic with the
fringe element of his base and denied the existence
of a bona fide insurrection, but he admitted privately
to Madison that the “occasional riots” had allowed the
“employing of military force for civil purposes” and
“answered the favorite purposes of strengthening gov-
ernment.”35 Thus, although the Federalists suspected
the Republicans of inciting rebellion, the situation
was in fact far worse than they thought, for Republi-
cans elites had little control over the democratic
societies, Whiskey rebels, or Daniel Shays who were
challenging the Federalist regime.
Nevertheless, as the Republic braced for war with
France, the Federalists maneuvered to break the
opposition permanently by raising a standing army
and passing the Alien and Sedition Laws. Three
alien laws subjected immigrants (a majority of
whom were thought to be Jefferson sympathizers) to
longer naturalization periods, deportation, and
imprisonment, and the Sedition Law further circum-
scribed the use of libelous words against the govern-
ment. Madison and Jefferson responded with the
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, which skirted
the line of secession by declaring the Alien and Sedi-
tion Laws null and void. Very soon thereafter, the
federal government sent troops to disperse yet
another rebellion of Pennsylvania farmers who rose
up this time against the newly instituted war tax. Pre-
sident John Adams described this period as a “critical
state of things”:
When Virginia and Kentucky, too nearly in
unison with the other southern and western
States, were menacing a separation; when
insurrection was flaming in Pennsylvania;
when Baltimore, at the head of one half of
Maryland, was glowing with opposition . . .
when the administration was threatened even
in the town of Boston.36
The mounting tension in the lead-up to the crisis of
1800–1801 therefore begs the question: did Jeffer-
son’s election represent a break with this trajectory?
That is, did it in fact carve out a peaceful, institutional
path to mass party competition? Because there was no
such path for managing dissent, none, I argue,
existed for routine partisan conflict. Indeed, the strat-
egy of the Jeffersonian opposition was to leave the
national theater, build their political and military
strength at the state level, and threaten secession
and civil war if Federalists refused to change their pol-
icies.37 That strategy finally bore fruit in Jefferson’s
second run for the presidency.
The outcome of the 1800 Electoral College vote was
as follows: Jefferson (73), Burr (73), Adams (65),
Pinckney (64), and Jay (1). In the absence of an Elec-
toral College majority, the Constitution mandates that
the House of Representatives decide which of the top
two candidates should become president, in this case,
Jefferson and his running mate, Aaron Burr. The
crisis developed when one portion of the lame duck
Federalist majority (the Jeffersonians would control
the incoming Congress) threw their votes to
Burr to deny Jefferson the presidency, producing a
deadlock on the first thirty-five ballots.38
33. George Washington, “Farewell address,” in A Compilation of
the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789–1902 (Vol. I), eds.
James D. Richardson and the Joint Committee on Printing,
United States Senate (Washington, DC: Bureau of National Litera-
ture and Art, 1904), 217–218.
34. Sean Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to
Lincoln (New York: Norton, 2005), 62–64.
35. Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy, 64; Thomas Jeffer-
son, “To James Madison. Monticello May 26. 1795,” in The Papers
of Thomas Jefferson, Volume 28, 1 January 1794 to 20 February 1796,
ed. John Catanzariti (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University
Press, 2000), 359.
36. Morton Grodzins, “Political Parties and the Crisis of Succes-
sion in the United States: The Case of 1800,” in Political Parties and
Political Development, eds. Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 310–311; James
Roger Sharp, American Politics in the Early Republic: The New Nation
in Crisis (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993),
12–13; Ferling, Adams vs. Jefferson, 108–111; John Adams, “To
James Lloyd. Quincy, January, 1815,” in The Works of John Adams,
Second President of the United States (Vol. X), ed. Charles Francis
Adams (Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1969), 112.
37. Sharp, American Politics in the Early Republic, 12.
38. Dunn, Jefferson’s Second Revolution, 196–213; Ferling, Adams
vs. Jefferson, 164–165, 172–173, 176, 192–193.
CEDRIC DE LEON130
It was the threat of civil war that ultimately com-
pelled the Federalists to acquiesce on the thirty-sixth
ballot and elect Jefferson president. Governors
McKean and Monroe mobilized the Pennsylvania
and Virginia militias respectively to prevent “Federal
usurpation,” and there were reports that the Mary-
land militia had planned to join them. Republicans
talked openly of a convention to reorganize the gov-
ernment. The Federalists for their part proposed to
send troops to put down the Virginia militia; some
blustered that the central government could count
on the 70,000 men of the Massachusetts militia.39
Private post-mortems of the crisis underscore the
decisiveness of the military threat in bringing about
a resolution. Jefferson wrote, “The certainty that leg-
islative usurpation would be resisted by arms . . .
brought over to us the whole body of Federalists,
who being alarmed with the danger of a dissolution
of the government, had been made most anxiously
to wish the very administration they had opposed.”
Madison likewise described the vulnerability of the
Federalists not in political, but in military, terms: “It
was thought not probable that the phalanx would
hold out agst. the general revolt of its partizans out
of doors & without any military force to abet usurpa-
tion.” On the other side of the aisle, James A. Bayard,
head of the Federalist delegation from Delaware and
the crucial swing vote during the crisis, wrote this of
its resolution: “The step was not taken until it was
admitted on all hands that we must risk the Consti-
tution and a civil war or take Mr. Jefferson.” To
suggest, then, that parties had come of age and inau-
gurated a period of routinized mass party compe-
tition is to ignore the very real threat of civil war,
which was greater in 1801 than in any other period
except 1860 to 1861.40
In addition, as I have hinted earlier, competing
post-revolutionary elites did not consider themselves
members of parties, but of temporary coalitions
forged for the purpose of destroying their adversaries
and wiping out parties forever. Sharp notes, “The
republicans believed that they and they alone were
the interpreters and translators of the wishes of a
fictive sovereign people. But so did the Federalists.
Under such circumstances, there could be little toler-
ance of opposition, for each proto-party was dedi-
cated to the ultimate destruction of its political
enemies, who were enemies of the people.” Hamil-
ton, for instance, asserted “the duty of a wise people
to discountenance and repress” what he called “the
common and continual mischiefs of the Spirit of
Party.” In the flush of Republican ascendancy, Jeffer-
son likewise expressed satisfaction that the Federalists’
“treasonable combinations” had at last “consigned
them to the tomb of the dead.” There were thus no
pretensions of institutionalizing a legal opposition
because Federalists and Republicans alike viewed
themselves not as parties but as “embodiments of
the nation’s will.” As Henry Adams once observed,
“To crush democracy by force . . . was the ultimate
resource of Hamilton. To crush that force was the
determined intention of Jefferson.” This unyielding
antipathy to parties eventually gave rise to a one-party
system and a second crisis of elite legitimacy.41
That mass parties had not taken hold explains why
the first party system disintegrated in the aftermath of
the 1801 crisis. If the political elites of the early
Republic did not see themselves as members of
parties, neither did they see themselves as pro-
fessional politicians. Public service was not a career,
but a duty and oftentimes a burden. Those like
Aaron Burr who saw it the other way were suspected,
as parties were, of pursuing a private agenda that was
dangerously at odds with the public good. Even
Hamilton, whose adversaries condemned him as the
worst partisan of them all, wrote privately to his Feder-
alist associates in favor of Jefferson’s election over
Burr in 1800. To Treasury Secretary Oliver Wolcott,
Jr., Hamilton expressed his preference in this way:
“There is no doubt but that upon every virtuous and
prudent calculation Jefferson is to be preferred. He
is by far not so dangerous a man and he has preten-
sions to character. As to Burr there is nothing in his
favour . . . If he can, he will certainly disturb our insti-
tutions to secure to himself permanent power and with it
wealth [his emphasis].” Because the elites of the first
party system were not professional politicians, many
either retired abruptly from public life (satisfied, for
instance, that they had defeated the Federalists once
and for all), or in the case of the post-1801 Federalists,
defected to the Republicans. The eventual result was
the fulfillment of the founders’ republican ideal: a
one-party system.42
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However, the one-party system, grounded as it was
in a suspicion of party discipline, merely permitted
an explosion of factions, which further undermined
elite legitimacy because no one faction recognized
another’s prerogative to rule. The tail end of the
Madison administration (1808–1816) had prefigured
the fall of the Republican consensus. Antiwar New
England Federalists, now nominally Republican, gath-
ered in Hartford to threaten disunion as the War of
1812 came to a close. Once a favorable peace was
made, the Federalists were disgraced as traitors but
were nonetheless permitted to remain in the Repub-
lican Party. Additionally, in chartering the Second
Bank of the United States in 1816, Madison simul-
taneously co-opted pro-bank Federalists under the
banner of “National” Republicanism and alienated
the adherents of “Old” Republicanism who clung
to Jefferson’s longstanding opposition to a strong
central government.43
If the Madison administration planted the seeds of
internecine rivalry, however, then it was the Monroe
administration that encouraged it to grow and entan-
gle postwar politics. Amidst the brief consensus and
prosperity of the immediate postwar era, the new pre-
sident expressed gratification at “the increased
harmony of opinion which pervades our Union.”
He added, “Discord does not belong to our system,”
and “the American people . . . constitute one great
family with a common interest.” Accordingly,
Monroe eschewed appeals to party discipline as a
means of advancing his legislative agenda, preferring
instead to hammer out a consensus among his
cabinet secretaries before presenting his initiatives
to Congress. This method was intermittently effective
because each secretary commanded his own personal
following in Congress, and consensus in the cabinet
typically precluded dissent in the legislative branch.
However, Monroe’s so-called “consolidation” policy
was more often ineffective for the same reason. In
his orthodox rejection of political considerations,
Monroe had knowingly chosen cabinet members
who were presidential aspirants, chief among these
being William H. Crawford (treasury), John Quincy
Adams (state), and John C. Calhoun (war). Each, in
turn, used their position to cultivate surrogates in
Congress, undermine the stature of the others, and
contradict the president in order to appear indepen-
dent and therefore presidential. Adams described the
factional rancor in this way, with special attention to
Crawford, who was rapidly emerging as his
arch-nemesis:
As the old line of demarkation [sic] between
parties has broken down, personal has taken
the place of principled opposition. The per-
sonal friends of the President in the House
are neither so numerous, nor so active, nor so
able as his opponents. Crawford’s personal
friends, instead of befriending the Adminis-
tration, operate as powerfully as they can,
without exposing or avowing their motives,
against it. Every act and thought of Crawford
looks to the next Presidency.
The effect of Monroe’s consolidation policy, then, was
partly to replace the erstwhile Federalist-Republican
divide with personal factionalism. The new terrain
was all the more obvious when irreconcilable differ-
ences made consensus impossible because the presi-
dent in these cases often advanced a bill without
consulting the cabinet, whereupon the secretaries
and their respective factions felt at liberty to attack
the administration.44
The problem of elite legitimacy was further compli-
cated by the doctrine of congressional superiority, a
longstanding Republican orthodoxy that confined
executive power to foreign affairs and assumed the
primacy of the legislative branch in all other
matters. The doctrine led legislators to gratuitously
oppose the administration so as not to be accused
of being stooges of the executive branch—this, the
worst possible insult in congressional politics. John
Forsyth, chairman of the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs and ardent supporter of the adminis-
tration, thus sponsored a resolution to seize Florida
against the president’s wishes to refute Henry Clay’s
charge that he was a White House lackey. Indeed,
Monroe could prevent the consideration of a bill
merely by expressing an opinion on the matter.
Accordingly, John Quincy Adams observed “a perpe-
tual struggle in both Houses of Congress to control
the Executive—to make it dependent upon and sub-
servient to them.”45
Finally, elite legitimacy was undermined still
further by the debate over states’ rights. Whereas
Madison, Monroe and the National Republicans
believed that the federal and state governments
each had ultimate authority within their own
spheres of influence (the doctrine of dual sover-
eignty), the Old Republicans articulated a confeder-
ated theory of sovereignty in which the federal
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government was merely the creature of the several
states. Thus, when the nationalist Marshall Court
denied the right of the states to tax a local branch
of the Bank of the United States in McCullough v.
Maryland, the Old Republicans revolted. Recalling
the crisis of 1801, Virginia Judge Spencer Roane
threatened armed defiance, and the Baltimore
editor, Hezekiah Niles, urged all people who hated
monopoly and privilege to rise up and “purge our
political temple of the money-changers.” The Penn-
sylvania, Tennessee, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois legis-
latures acted in kind and demanded a constitutional
amendment forbidding Congress to incorporate a
bank.46
The factious effects of these practices—the consoli-
dation policy, the doctrine of congressional superior-
ity, and the clash over states’ rights—would eventually
be blunted by mass party discipline because the struc-
ture and discourse of party command would stretch
from the White House, through Congress, across
regions and states to the rank-and-file and back
again. However, in the absence of mass party disci-
pline, these practices precipitated another crisis of
elite legitimacy.
If National Republicanism remained a formidable
political force through the Madison administration
and Monroe’s first term, it became utterly defunct
with the Panic of 1819, the first peacetime depression
in U.S. history. Though the causes of the panic were
primarily geopolitical in nature as former stockpiles
of manufactures and raw materials overwhelmed
American producers after the War of 1812 and the
Napoleonic Wars, the enemies of the administration
could justifiably point their fingers at the mismanage-
ment of the Bank of the United States (BUS).
Through pure negligence the BUS had allowed its
local branches to extend credit to land speculators
and farmers beyond the amount of gold specie they
had to back those loans, creating a bubble in property
values that burst when the price of cotton fell to
reflect the postwar glut. The resulting depression
unleashed a torrent of divisions to add to the
already factious soup of presidential aspirants and
Old and National Republicans: hard versus soft
money, pro- and anti-bank, advocates and opponents
of economic retrenchment, tariff and anti-tariff. The
absence of party command deepened the financial
debacle. The president had attempted to mitigate
the crushing influx of cheap imports by presenting
a tariff bill to Congress, but because the cabinet was
divided on the issue, Monroe did not consult them,
releasing his secretaries and other adversaries to
finally scuttle the bill in the Senate. Henry Clay,
then Speaker of the House, mocked Monroe’s conso-
lidation policy as he clamored for economic
retrenchment:
Instead of assembling them together and
saying in an authorative [sic] tone, Gentlemen
here are our means; reduce your expences [sic]
within them; and if they will not settle the
matter among themselves, fixing himself how
much each shall be reduced, he permits every
one of them in Congress to exert the whole
force of his own little coterie, backed by the
name of the administration, and thus to
defeat every project of oeconomy [sic].47
The absence of mass party discipline likewise per-
mitted sectional conflicts to emerge as the Congress
considered the admission of Missouri to the Union.
Three parties were active in the dispute, the Federalist,
National Republican, and Old Republican, and these
in turn split into geographical factions that either
opposed or advocated the right of the central govern-
ment to “restrict” slavery in the territories. Thus, other-
wise nationalist elites like John C. Calhoun and William
Lowndes of South Carolina became anti-restrictionists,
and longstanding inter-regional alliances like that of
Pennsylvania and Virginia fractured.48
Though the Missouri Compromise was eventually
reached, it was not party discipline that made it poss-
ible but rather the same kinds of threats that resolved
the crisis of 1801. In private correspondence, Henry
Clay wrote, “The words, civil war, and disunion, are
uttered almost without emotion, and a Senator of
the United States, in this place, as I understand, said
the other day that he would rather have both than
fail in the resolution.” Echoing the sentiments in
the Senate, Judge Spencer Roane warned the presi-
dent that he would rather take the South out of the
Union than be “damned up in a land of slaves by
the Eastern people.” The rationale that congressmen
gave for switching their votes to compromise suggests
that the prospect of civil war and disunion was once
again the decisive factor leading to the end of a
national crisis. Representative Charles Kinsey of New
Jersey said to his colleagues, “Should we persist to
reject the olive branch now offered, the most disas-
trous consequences will follow.” Jonathan Mason of
Massachusetts “was also distraught at ‘one half of
the Union in complete array against the other, by a
geographical line.’” Mark Hill, Mason’s colleague in
the Massachusetts delegation, said he “would do what-
ever he could to restrict slavery, but ‘without setting
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the United States on fire.’” Congressman Bernard
Smith explained, “I did what I considered necessary
to prevent a dissolution of the Union.”49
In his diary, John Quincy Adams summed up the
so-called Era of Good Feelings in this way:
The bank, the national currency, the stagna-
tion of commerce, the depression of manufac-
tures, the restless turbulence and jealousies
and insubordination of the State Legislatures,
the Missouri slave question, the deficiencies
of the revenue to be supplied, the rankling pas-
sions and ambitious projects of individuals,
mingling with everything, presented a prospect
of the future which I freely acknowledge was to
me appalling.50
It should be no surprise, then, that the election of
1824, in which Adams himself was a player, produced
no fewer than five major candidates for the presi-
dency, each representing personal and regional fac-
tions too weak to carry a majority of Electoral
College votes. Though Calhoun eventually dropped
out of the race, the remaining four-way split threw
the election to the House of Representatives for the
first time since 1801.51 Such was the normal and
expected state of things that most partisans, including
Martin Van Buren, acquiesced to the will of Congress
despite murmurings that President-Elect Adams had
promised Henry Clay the position of secretary of
state in exchange for his support in the House, the
so-called “corrupt bargain.” Andrew Jackson, the
front-runner in the late election before its congres-
sional phase when Adams prevailed, was decidedly
not acquiescent however, and it was around this senti-
ment that Van Buren and his cohort coalesced to
form a permanent Jeffersonian party.
VICARIOUS REVOLUTIONARIES: MARTIAL DISCOURSE
AND THE STABILIZATION OF MASS PARTY POLITICS
The first party system, then, was not a mass party
system. Instead of mass mobilization, early national
elites depended on violence, threats of civil war and
disunion, and the federal courts to decide the politi-
cal questions of the day. All these factors made elites
vulnerable to successive crises of legitimacy. At that
moment, however, the political operatives of the
second party system recuperated and reconstituted
the quasi-military discursive practices of their prede-
cessors to craft an idiom for mass politics that
turned on the binary struggle between the putative
descendants of the British aristocracy on the one
hand and the undivided ranks of second generation
patriots on the other. Thus, together with the theor-
etical strands of party discourse, martial rhetoric
helped to stabilize the party system by providing an
acceptable framework through which a) antiparty
national elites could embrace their turn to party
organization, b) local elites could find their identity
in the emerging mass party apparatus, and c) voters
could participate actively in elective politics. Martial
discourse, in other words, aided in recruiting these
different sets of political actors to the practice of
mass partisanship and thereby contributed to the
stabilization of partisan conflict.
Discursive Origins of Social Change
Martial discourse grew out of three inherited discur-
sive practices: electioneering rituals, the defensive
prerogative of revolutionary republicanism, and the
concept of regenerative war. First, though many of
the revolution’s “minutemen” were volunteer guer-
rilla fighters, the electioneering rituals of the first
party system were highly regimented affairs that
more closely approximated the maneuvers of pro-
fessional armies. Federalist street processions, for
instance, were orderly parades designed to persuade
entire communities to unify behind essentially con-
servative positions. Republicans employed the mili-
tary form to organize young working class men at
election time. In Philadelphia, one such organization
was called the “Democratic committee of vigilance,”
and in Pittsburgh local ward bosses used military
terms such as “enlistment,” “brigade,” and “brigadier
general” to organize their canvassing operations.
A contemporary of eighteenth century electioneering
ritual thus observed, “The parties were drilled to
move together in a body.” Early political elites in
effect re-imagined the patriots of the American Revo-
lution into the trained soldiers of a permanent stand-
ing army and then insisted that their constituents
follow “their example.” This slippage worked to desta-
bilize the old discursive order by providing a revisio-
nist historical basis for permanent party
organization.52
Second, mass party elites seized selectively on the
defensive prerogative in republican discourse, which
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the English Country Whig, Henry St. John, Lord
Bolingbroke. In A Dissertation upon Parties and The
Idea of a Patriot King, Bolingbroke offered his rationale
for organizing an opposition party against Sir Robert
Walpole, who, in his view, sought to subject the Parlia-
ment, representative of the rights of the country, to
the kingly court. Bolingbroke believed that combi-
nation was treasonous as a general rule but was the
highest form of patriotism whenever wicked men con-
spired to undermine the constitution. Accordingly,
such action was always meant to be self-liquidating:
when the conspiracy was defeated, the opposition
would dissolve, and a patriot king would gather
unto himself a group of virtuous men to govern in
the interest of the entire country instead of the
selfish few.53
Eventually, however, incipient Democrats would
drop the self-liquidating imperative of Bolingbroke
republicanism, citing a permanent security risk to
the new Republic. Routing out a fifth-column “aristoc-
racy” required a permanent disciplinary device that
could unmask otherwise unidentifiable traitors. Van
Buren reasoned that the only viable weapon against
this crypto-nobility was permanent party organiz-
ation, which, he argued, using the wartime language
of espionage and infiltration, would serve to “excite
a salutary vigilance over our public functionaries”
and “tear the masks from several, who without
having been exposed . . . might have been able . . . to
have passed for what they are not.”54
A third source of martial discourse was the republi-
can concept of regenerative war. As Kruman writes,
“The martial rhetoric of the parties also expressed
the continuing republican belief . . . that war affirmed,
celebrated, and regenerated the polity.” Henry Clay,
for example, advocated war with Great Britain in
1812 because prolonged peace and prosperity had,
in his view, weakened the American polity. Thus,
Clay intoned, “I prefer the troubled ocean of war,
demanded by the honor and independence of the
country with all its calamities, and desolations, to
the tranquil, putrescent pool of ignominious
peace.”55 The emergence of martial discourse as a jus-
tification for mass party competition therefore
depended on the misapplication of the concept of
regenerative war from military warfare where Clay
had originally intended it, to political warfare where
Clay and his compatriots later redirected it. Critical
to the concept of regeneration was the binary of
decay and corruption on the one hand, and the pur-
ifying potential of war on the other. The word
“campaign,” then, was indigenous to martial, not pol-
itical, discourse. Eventually the “political campaign”
came to be seen as a mechanism for clearing away
the corruption or rot that had been preying on the
vitals of the nation.
Together, the reinvention of the revolutionary
militia, the defensive prerogative, and regenerative
war worked to rehabilitate the political party as an
army for the orderly and permanent defense of the
Republic, not necessarily against an external foe,
but more often against the internal threat of moral
decay and corruption. Accordingly, the rhetoric of
political warfare often involved two interlocking
themes: patriotic solidarity and relentless pursuit
of a hidden, fifth-column aristocracy. Martial rhetoric
therefore shared in the theoretical foundations of
partyist discourse, but it was its mass appeal
and recruiting capacity that concerns us here. In
the next subsection, we explore the ways in which
leading antiparty politicians came to accept mass
partisanship through the language of martial
discourse.
Social Change at the Top
When the principal factions of the second generation
elite began to compete in earnest for the leadership
of the Republic after 1824, each turned to partisan
organization for advantage but embraced their shift
in strategy using martial metaphors. For example,
after the Adams administration’s demoralizing loss
in New York, where victory was all but assured with
the opposition split between Democrats and Antima-
sons, Henry Clay explained the defeat to his col-
league, William B. Lawrence, in this way:
The [Albany] Regency and the Antimasons
were both organized; our friends were not.
The consequence was that both of the former
parties went to the polls with their forces mar-
shalled [sic] and with objects in view, whilst
our friends repaired to them, helter skelter,
leaving things to take what course they
might. . . . Let us march directly to our object.
It is the manly course. Let us hoist our
banner and rally our friends and organize
them for systematic action.
Rather than continue exclusively with the bureau-
cratic theme of “organization” where his explanation
began, Clay switches metaphors, preferring instead to
contrast the marshaled forces of the opposition with
those of the Adams administration who repaired to
them helter skelter. Clay might have also framed a
remedy to his party’s disorganization in any number
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of ways, but he returned instead to the metaphor of
the battlefield. Faced with the prospect of future
losses to an organized opposition, Clay drew on the
revisionist view of the revolutionary militia as a pro-
fessional army and urged his colleagues to act more
like trained soldiers, to “march,” to hoist their
“banner,” and to “rally.”56
As a key advisor to the Adams administration, Clay
was naturally suspicious of oppositional politics, but
General Andrew Jackson, the first figurehead of the
Democratic Party, was no less suspicious. As late as
1824 when Martin Van Buren called a congressional
caucus (precursor to the modern party convention)
to nominate a presidential candidate, Jackson
refused to attend. Upon winning his presidential
re-election campaign in 1832, however, Jackson,
once the reluctant partisan, now wrote to Van
Buren explaining the need for the Democratic Party
in this way:
Wisdom says, be always guarded against the
council and combination of the wicked,
the precaution suggested is one of safety . . .
The opposition is broken and scattered, still
tho scotched not dead, and it behooves us to
proceed to unite and give energy to our
democratic brethren [his emphasis].
In this passage, Jackson repeats Van Buren’s version of
the defensive prerogative. Unlike Bolingbroke, he
argues for a permanent defense to “guard” against a
“combination of the wicked.” For although the oppo-
sition is “broken and scattered” like a defeated army,
they are still “not dead.” Given this weak but desperate
foe, Jackson councils “safety” and urges Van Buren,
even in the full flush of his re-election victory, to con-
tinue to “unite and give energy” to the Democratic
Party.57
Thus, in the emerging encounter between the
competing factions of the second-generation elite,
previously antiparty statesmen became convinced
(and subsequently tried to convince others) of the
need for party discipline through the use of martial
imagery. Clay exhorted his party to behave more
like a professional army, and Jackson argued for a per-
manent partisan bulwark against the defeated opposi-
tion. In the next subsection, we examine how the
logic of martial discourse enabled local elites in
Chicago and Tuscaloosa to find their identity in the
mass party apparatus.
Social Change in the Middle
Local party elites appear to have embraced one of two
identities in the party system. One such identity was
that of sentinel or guardian to the local party. An
early Jacksonian organ in Tuscaloosa called the Flag
of the Union responded to the growing hostility to
the Jackson administration by saying, “We are appre-
hensive we cannot with the faithful watchman of the
night, cry out, ‘all’s well’” (Flag of the Union, 11 July
1833). Likewise, Congressman William R. Smith,
editor of Tuscaloosa’s Whig organ, the Independent
Monitor, made sense of his own role in the party in
this way:
A free press in a free country, ought to be the
guardian of liberty; and all who share in
directing its influence should feel themselves
invested with the responsibilities of sentinels
upon the watchtowers of freedom. But a press
prostituted to unworthy purposes becomes
faithless to this high trust, and its most danger-
ous of all foes, to the true principles of
liberty—precisely as treachery is more formid-
able, than all the machinations of open hosti-
lity. (Independent Monitor, 1 December 1838)
The binary logic of the revolution is palpable in this
passage. Smith argues in vivid martial prose that
those like him, who direct the influence of the
press, are the “guardian of liberty” and the “sentinels
upon the watchtowers of freedom.” Accordingly,
those editors who abuse that trust are the “most
dangerous of all foes” to the cause of liberty, for
instead of engaging in “open hostility,” they perpe-
trate a subtle “treachery” against the Republic itself.
When local elites did not explicitly call themselves
“sentinels” or “guardians,” they behaved
matter-of-factly as if they were. In this excerpt from
Tuscaloosa’s Democratic Gazette, the editor reviews
Whig strategy with the gaze of a sentinel perched on
high, surveying the movements of the opposing
army below:
They desert the old and plain path of honesty
and fair dealing, for one bordered by ravines
and bushes, and other places of concealment;
they shun the hill top, lest they should be
seen in the clear atmosphere of truth, and
seek the swamp and the dell, that when their
disguises fail them they may conceal them-
selves. (Democratic Gazette, 12 December 1843)
The editor of the Gazette does three things at once in
this passage. First, he exploits the well-worn martial
themes of espionage and infiltration used earlier by
Van Buren to describe those who pretend to be
Democrats in order to win office. Second, in his
desire to discipline the Democratic base, the Gazette’s
editor conveniently forgets that the revolutionary
militia’s only chance of victory against a predictably
regimented British army were the very same
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unpredictable tactics that he now denounces as cow-
ardice and concealment. Finally, the editor, unlike
Van Buren, goes out of his way to construct a very par-
ticular vantage point; he surveys the terrain of the pol-
itical battlefield from the perspective of a watchman,
and, having detected the Whigs’ maneuver, then
sounds the alarm to “rally to the standard of the
defeated leader of 1840,” former President Martin
Van Buren.
A year later, Tuscaloosa Democrats published a
weekly campaign sheet, whose prospectus described
the paper as the protector of the local Democratic
cause. Again the rationale for printing the sheet was
framed in martial terms: “It is the antidote by
which, to check the inroads of political fraud and mis-
representation—the weapons by which alone, the
democratic party will be assailed” (Democratic Mentor,
20 March 1844). The editor thus asserts that the
Democrats will be unbeatable so long as he keeps
the party’s principles before the people and
guards—as an “antidote” does the body—against
Whig “fraud and misrepresentation,” the only
“weapons” by which the party can be “assailed.” The
editor then lays out the party’s platform and ends
with a rhetorical flourish in which he confers upon
himself the solemn duty of preparing the Democratic
army for war. “With those principles inscribed upon
our standard,” he proclaims, “we are ready to enter
the field of combat.”
A second but equally important identity embraced
by local elites was that of mid-level commander whose
job it was to simultaneously urge the army into battle
and unify the ranks. As the financial panic of 1837 set
in, for example, Congressman John Wentworth, the
Chicago Democrat’s editor, called on his brethren to
wage war against Nicholas Biddle, head of the
Second Bank of the United States. In doing so, he
expressed the more aggressive oppositional ten-
dencies of the new mass partisanship:
Let us a wage a war of extermination against
Bank minions, Bank advocates and Bank
owners! . . . The battle field is before us—the
golden troops of Biddle are in martial array,
and let us vanquish them or perish in the last
ditch. (Chicago Democrat, 16 July 1837)
Here Wentworth cloaks the political conflict over the
panic in the binary logic of the revolution while sim-
ultaneously recalling the “Indian Removal” cam-
paigns that had made Andrew Jackson a war hero
and, in turn, a presidential contender. Bank
minions, advocates, and owners comprise the aristo-
cratic (“golden”) troops of Nicholas Biddle who are
in ominous “martial array,” whereas the patriotic
non-elite victims of the crisis, presumably all
rank-and-file Democrats, comprise the “us,” whom
Wentworth exhorts—like General Jackson before
him—to wage a war of nothing less than
“extermination.”
In the heat of the 1840 presidential race, William
Stuart, the editor of the Whig Chicago American, like-
wise embodied the role of the aggressive mid-level
commander:
WHIG EDITORS! We call on you in the
language of the Globe, to “abandon your
defensive-warfare, and charge home upon the
enemy.” The old Hero needs no apologies at
your hands!—Your duty now is to expose the
corrupt practices of this rotten administration.
Do not spare the knife!—do not spare the lash!
Let them have it—let them have it!—“Charge
along the whole line.” [their emphasis]
(Chicago American, 21 August 1840)
Stuart’s spirited appeal significantly outlines a chain
of command, from the “old Hero” (Whig presidential
candidate, General William Henry Harrison), to the
Globe (the Whigs’ national party organ), and then to
all local party papers like his own, whose job now is
to shift from a “defensive” posture and “charge
home” upon the Democrats. In this way, martial
language enables Stuart not only to find his place in
the mass party apparatus, but also to receive
“orders” for the next tactical maneuver. Note that
this passage reveals a heretofore unheard of level of
oppositional sentiment, one that might have been
shocking to an otherwise antiparty public, but
which Stuart couches in stirring martial appeals that
recall their ancestors’ impossible war against Great
Britain. Although the “old Hero” refers to Harrison,
the allusion (made by Harrison’s moniker and mili-
tary rank) is to the country’s first general, George
Washington. The memory of the latter, set in the
language of regenerative war against the “corrupt
practices” of President Van Buren’s “rotten adminis-
tration,” work to justify Stuart’s oppositional zeal.
The oppositional dimension to the role of mid-level
commander was complemented by appeals to martial
unity, which, having been drawn from the older
antiparty strains of revolutionary republicanism,
expressed impatience with dissension in the ranks.
During the struggle between Martin Van Buren and
Lewis Cass for the 1844 Democratic presidential
nomination, which eventuated in the compromise
candidacy of James K. Polk, Wentworth commanded
his colleagues to “cease your battles for a while
among yourselves and turn your cannon upon the
common foe, as every blow you strike against your-
selves is so much in aid of the federal party.”
(Chicago Democrat, 7 February 1844) Instead of
making a straightforward appeal to party unity, Went-
worth exploits the evocative imagery of cannon fire to
convey the urgency of their predicament, adding
that “every blow you strike against yourselves”
merely advanced the cause of “the federal party.”
That the Democrat uses the memory of federalism
here in place of Whiggism bears mention, as well,
for the former comprised in Democratic circles the
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traitorous faction that emerged immediately after the
revolution without warning.
Of course, Wentworth was not always so reasonable.
Late in the 1844 campaign season, in an editorial
printed some eight months after the preceding
passage, he warned, “Any man elected on the demo-
cratic ticket who will go for any kind of a bank or
for the resuscitation of the old ones will commit a
fraud on his party and will receive the traitor’s
reward.” (Chicago Democrat, 9 October 1844) Recalling
the repressive impulse of Washington and Hamilton
before him, Wentworth assumes the prerogative of
the military commander to mete out to his troops
the “traitor’s reward,” which was nothing less than a
death sentence. The phrase is an allusion to the
term “decapitation,” which, in antebellum political
circles, meant to be removed from one’s position in
the party. Those who broke ranks after the election,
in other words, would find themselves without the
party’s nomination in the next election cycle.
Martial discourse therefore helped to stabilize
party politics among local elites by providing a frame-
work within which they could carve out an identity for
themselves in the emerging mass party system. Some
editors self-consciously viewed themselves as the
press and likened their role in the party to that of
guardians or sentinels. Others embraced the role of
a mid-level commander who both united the local
party and led them into political battle.
Social Change on the Ground
Martial discourse also allowed voters a way to partici-
pate in elective politics as the foot soldiers of their
respective parties. In this, electoral parades provide
a crucial data source. We begin with examples from
outside Illinois and Alabama to give a sense of the
nationwide acceptance of martial practices among
voters. In Tennessee, grassroots Whig activists, called
“Bell Guards,” were said to number around 10,000,
and the voters and precinct captains of both parties
were reportedly “organized into uniform companies
and regularly drilled.” According to the same
report, 17,000 people joined a recent procession,
while an estimated 60,000 to 70,000 looked on.
(Chicago American, 2 September 1844) Similarly, in
the District of Columbia, the Independent Monitor
reported, “Young Men formed a procession, and
with their banners and emblems raised on high,
marched in fine order through the principal
avenues of the city.” (Independent Monitor, 20 March
20 1840) Martial discourse therefore manifested
itself on the ground in the literal regimentation of
the mass electorate. Voters enthusiastically embraced
the military aesthetic, plugging themselves into the
political process as the infantrymen of the respective
parties. Figure 1 is an artist’s depiction of a Whig pro-
cession during the 1840 presidential campaign. The
piece reveals all the trappings of an antebellum
professional army, including flags, weapons, the fife
and drum, horses, and uniformed horsemen and
marchers, offering voters any number of “positions”
to take up in the course of just one political event.
Note, too, that party headquarters were located not
at a church, city hall, or other civilian building, but
at “Northern Military Hall” where the candidate,
General William Henry Harrison, is pictured on his
horse as the leader of the army and party and the
people’s standard-bearer.58
Tuscaloosa had its share of martial processions. In
the editorial below, the Whig Monitor chides the
Democrats for complaining about a local parade for
Harrison during the 1840 presidential campaign.
The parade of the Whig ranks is clearly martial in
character, as this passage suggests:
How the Democrats of Tuscaloosa wail and
deplore the Whig spirit which could so far
leap over all decency in the late procession in
this city, as to induce one of the Marshals of
the day to carry holsters at his saddle bow.
Come, ye civil and peace-loving Democrats,
do not be frightened at this display of the trap-
pings of war . . . The “holsters” which you have
thought proper to embody in your address,
were only part of a saddle covering intended
for military occasions, and had no pistols in
them—not even were they surcharged. (Inde-
pendent Monitor, 12 June 1840)
The significance of this editorial is two-fold. First, if by
1840 it had become a common practice for the
rank-and-file to “drill” during the course of the cam-
paign season, then the Whig ranks had become so
enthusiastic in their embrace of the martial form
that they were now displaying “holsters” and other
“trappings of war,” much to the dismay of even the
Democrats. Second, that this argument over the
proper conduct of political parades took place in
Tuscaloosa, Alabama suggests, with the foregoing
example from Tennessee, that the martial mobiliz-
ation of voters had now reached the capital cities of
the western states and thus were likely in operation
even in the capillary locales of the body politic.
What seemed to animate this enthusiasm for the
martial form was a sense of kinship with the original
revolutionary patriots. When the Democrats cele-
brated their victory in the 1844 presidential election
at a martial procession in Washington, DC, the Illinois
rank-and-file delegation, which was said to include a
contingent of “day laborers,” carried a banner that
was described as follows:59
58. Lamont Buchanan, Ballot for Americans: a pictorial history of
American elections and electioneering with the top political personalities,
1789–1956 (New York: Dutton, 1956), 26.
59. For the use of banners as a data source for subaltern sub-
jectivity, see Sean Wilentz, Chants Democratic: New York City and the
Rise of the American Working Class, 1788–1850 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1984).
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Col. Ezekiel Polk, mounted as an officer in the
revolutionary army. Motto: “He dispersed the
tories in the snow campaign of ’76; his grand-
son will scatter them in the fall campaign of
’44.” Reverse motto: “Infamy to the catiff slan-
derers of the departed patriot hero of the revo-
lution. (Chicago Democrat, 25 December 1844)
The banner tells of President-elect Polk’s grandfather,
a veteran of the revolutionary war who was allegedly
slandered in the course of the election campaign.
The text is a classic martial reference to the American
Revolution, in which a direct line is drawn from the
revolutionary generation’s military conquests to the
Fig. 1. Whig Procession, 1840.
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second generation’s conquests on the field of political
battle. More importantly for our purposes, the
rank-and-file appear to have internalized the binary
logic of martial discourse. They view themselves as
soldiers in this new political army, commanded by
Ezekiel Polk’s grandson, and view their counterparts
in the Whig Party as the descendants of the “tories
in the snow campaign of ’76.”
Martial discourse therefore provided voters with a
language for participating in, and celebrating, their
activism on behalf of the political parties. A
rank-and-file Chicago Democrat named John
Moore, for instance, wrote this letter to the editor,
describing his plans for handling the Whigs in the
upcoming presidential election: “The whigs of this
district are already beginning to rally their scattered
forces for the coming contest; but we will again
meet the enemy and make them ours.” (Chicago Demo-
crat, 20 March 1844) The author proudly promises to
deliver the votes of his district to the Democratic
Party, and does so by using the rhetorical tools of
local and national party elites. In a single sentence,
he, too, manages to repeat the binary logic of
martial discourse. Moore conveys a kind of wartime
urgency by announcing that the Whigs have begun
to “rally their scattered forces” and then states his
and his fellow Democrats’ determination to “meet
the enemy and make them ours.”
The sentiments of Tuscaloosa Democrats were no
different at this time. At a local meeting, Democratic
voters vowed to maintain martial unity for the remain-
der of the 1844 presidential campaign: “Resolved, . . .
we pledge ourselves to enter into the coming
canvass as a band of brothers, bound together by
the ties of principle, and animated by the confident
hope of obtaining glorious victory.” (Democratic
Gazette, 13 June 1844) In this passage, the Democratic
ranks articulate their mission in the coming months,
not in organizational, but in martial terms. They
pledge to be soldiers like the original “band of broth-
ers,” a reference to the martial unity of the revolution-
ary patriots, and to march toward “glorious victory,” a
common rhetorical phrase for equating electoral
success with military renown.
The capacity of the martial form to provide voters
with a way to participate actively in elective politics
contributed to party stabilization on the ground, a
finding that is reflected in the rise in voter turnout
for the major party candidates after 1824 when
martial rhetoric and the theoretical strands of partyist
discourse became entrenched. Table 1 compares
voter turnout for the 1824 and 1844 presidential elec-
tions in Alabama, Illinois, and Tuscaloosa’s and Chi-
cago’s home counties. Recall that the 1824 contest
was notable for its lack of party discipline, with the
five personal factions of the Monroe years each
putting up their own candidate. In 1844, turnout in
Alabama rose 26 points or by about half the 1824
figure. In Tuscaloosa, turnout increased by 80
percent. The effect of mass party discipline was even
more marked in Illinois, where turnout tripled state-
wide and went from virtually nil to an astonishing
92 percent in Chicago’s home county.60
CONCLUSION
At all levels of the body politic, then, from nationally
prominent elites to local party editors and voters on
the ground, martial discourse aided in the recruit-
ment of different sets of actors into the practice of
mass partisanship. After the 1824 presidential elec-
tion, previously antiparty national elites accepted
the need for mass party discipline and indeed tried
to convince others of that need, using military
imagery. At the local level, martial discourse provided
a logic within which Chicago and Tuscaloosa elites
could see themselves as sentinels or mid-level military
Table 1. State and County Level Estimated Voter Turnout for the
1824 and 1844 Presidential Elections
Region Estimated voter
turnout, 1824 (%)
Estimated voter
turnout, 1844 (%)
Alabama 57.83 83.62
Illinois 30.65 95.61
Tuscaloosa
County
47.67 85.44
Clark/Cook
County
8.30 92.00
60. The 1824 electoral returns for Illinois and Clark County
were retrieved from Tufts University Digital Collection and
Archives, “A New Nation Votes: American Election Returns 1787–
1825,” http://elections.lib.tufts.edu/aas_portal/index.xq
(accessed 9 Jan. 2009). Note that in 1820, Chicago was part of
Clark County. Cook County was organized in 1831. The 1824 elec-
toral returns for Alabama and Tuscaloosa County are from the
Alabama Secretary of State, “Election files - state and national,
1823-ongoing,” (Montgomery, AL: Office of the Secretary of
State, State of Alabama, 1823-ongoing), housed at the Alabama
Department of Archives and History in Montgomery. The 1844
electoral returns for Illinois and Cook County are from the Inter-
university Consortium for Political and Social Research, UNITED
STATES HISTORICAL ELECTION RETURNS, 1824–1968 [Com-
puter file], Study 1 Part 0057: Election Returns for Illinois, 1824–
1878 (Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political
and Social Research, 1999). For the 1844 electoral returns for
Alabama and Tuscaloosa County, see the Tuscaloosa Democratic
Gazette 28 Nov. 1844. The voting age white male population was
extrapolated from U.S. Census data in ICPSR Study 3 by subtracting
the number of free white males under 20 years of age from the total
number of free white males. Inter-university Consortium for Politi-
cal and Social Research, HISTORICAL, DEMOGRAPHIC, ECON-
OMIC, AND SOCIAL DATA: THE UNITED STATES, 1790–1970
[Computer file], Study 3 (Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consor-
tium for Political and Social Research, 197?). It should be noted
that while the voting age in this period was 21, the number of
20-year-old free white men is likely to have been offset by the
increase in population in the four years between the decennial
census and the election in each case.
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commanders. Finally, the data suggest that martial
discourse offered voters a way to participate actively
in elective politics, an opportunity that they embraced
partly because of an imagined affinity with the
original foot soldiers of the revolution.
Historians of party formation emphasize the formal
and legalistic aspects of the theory of party. In con-
trast, this account highlights the role of a no less per-
vasive, but perhaps more pedestrian, rhetoric in
overcoming the antipartyism of the early national
electorate. In doing so, my goal has not been to sup-
plant existing accounts of the transition to mass party
competition, but rather to integrate a relatively neg-
lected chapter into the story that already exists on
the subject. Specifically, I have attempted to syn-
thesize the literatures on martial discourse and anti-
partyism by combining the insights of Kruman and
Leonard respectively. The resulting claim is that the
mass appeal of military language and thus its role in
stabilizing partisan conflict is linked to its impatience
for division in the patriot ranks and its call to arms
against the remnants of British aristocracy. Martial dis-
course therefore offered something to second-
generation politicians, operatives, and voters that
the more scholarly threads of party discourse did
not, namely, the opportunity to “fight” in a revolution
they had missed. Accordingly, I have defined “recruit-
ment” not in stark causal terms, but as an unfolding
process of recognition, in which otherwise isolated
social groups came to recognize their complementary
roles in the incipient mass party apparatus through
the lens of revolutionary wartime discipline.
Moreover, the process of recognition sheds light on
the mobilizing practices of early mass parties without
wading into the debate over which social cleavage
constituted the principal cleavage of the Jacksonian
Era. We have seen how the Democrats fused martial
discourse with the banking issue to interpellate
voters as class actors, but martial discourse was also
used to mobilize voters along the ethnocultural
lines privileged by Lee Benson and Ronald Formi-
sano. In response to Whig attempts to disfranchise
immigrants, German rank-and-file Democrats
hoisted this banner at the aforementioned victory
parade for President-elect Polk: “De Kalb, the
German hero of the revolution must be protected
in the land for whose liberties he fought and
died . . . Remember the war cry of the whigs, when
feloniously robbing on the highway to the polls the
German citizen of his rights: ‘Another damned
black Dutchman—knock him down—beat out his
brains.’” (Chicago Democrat, 25 December 1844)
Thus, it was partly within the martial framework that
German voters came to recognize themselves as
both Democrats and Americans, the true successors
to DeKalb and the patriot cause. Furthermore, in
their exhortation to other Germans to “remember”
the xenophobic “war cry” of the Whigs, they reveal
their intention to recruit still other Germans to the
Democratic Party.61
Finally, this paper has something to say about politi-
cal parties and democracy. It puts party elites and pol-
itical discourse at the center of democratic transitions
and expansions, thus revising the widely held assump-
tion that social classes are the prime movers of demo-
cratization. In doing so, the paper also enriches
elite-driven accounts of electoral competition, like
those of Aldrich, Shefter, and the literature on office-
seeking and political ambition, by adding a complex
cultural dimension to what elites must do, first to
justify the existence of parties if necessary, and then
to use salient discursive tropes to win.62
61. Lee Benson, The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy: New York as
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